THE NEXT GENERATION OF THE MEASUREMENT OF CORRUPTION:

New measures for new purposes

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THE NEXT GENERATION OF THE MEASUREMENT OF CORRUPTION:
New measures for new purposes

One of the central debates in the global anti-corruption community is that of corruption measurement. A quarter of a century ago, the main purposes behind the first international measures of corruption was to overcome complacency and instigate change in the way governments responded to corruption. Yet, we know little about how the various global indicators of corruption get used, and public officials with an anti-corruption mandate still need to know whether they are doing well, so that they do not believe that they are succeeding when they are failing or the other way around. In this paper, Kamel Ayadi, Chair of the Global Infrastructure Anti-corruption Centre in Tunisia and a former Minister of Public Service Governance and Anti-corruption in the same country, together with Todd Foglesong, Lecturer and Fellow-in-Residence at the University of Toronto, articulate seven purposes and principles to animate the development of alternatives to gross global indicators of corruption and to invite government officials into such a collaboration.

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DO WE NEED NEW MEASURES OF CORRUPTION?

Purposes and Principles for the Next Generation of Measurement

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Our statistics and accounts reflect our aspirations, the values that we assign things. They are inseparable from our vision of the world and the economy, of society, and our conception of human beings and our interrelations. Treating these as objective data, as if they are external to us, beyond question or dispute, is undoubtedly reassuring and comfortable, but it's dangerous. It's dangerous because we stop asking ourselves about the purpose of what we are doing, what we are actually measuring, and what lessons we need to draw.

– Nicolas Sarkozy[1]

Now that he's been convicted of bribing a judge, it might be tempting to disregard former President Sarkozy's warnings about moral complacency. But what if he was right, and not just about the consequences of mistaking GDP for wealth and prosperity but also about the speciousness of standardised measures of all global affairs, including corruption?[2] Do global measures of corruption deceive and distract us from our purposes? If so, what should we do?

One of the purposes behind the first international measures of corruption a quarter of a century ago was to overcome complacency and instigate change in the way governments respond to corruption, and yet we know little about how the wide array of global indicators of corruption get used, by whom, and with what results. We do not know, for example, whether governments that rely on expert estimates of the extent of corruption in the Corruption Perceptions Index or the World Governance Indicators or the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index have greater success in reducing corruption than those who rely on the public perceptions captured in Gallup's World Poll, the Afrobarometer, the Asian Values Survey, or the Global Corruption Barometer. No one has yet developed an index for appraising the effectiveness of indicators of corruption.

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1   From the foreword to Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi, *Mismeasuring Our Lives: Why GDP Doesn't' Add Up: Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress*, The New Press, 2010, vii-viii

2   Sarkozy's worries about global measures were echoed by the philosopher Alain Supiot, who analysed the "dream of harmony through statistics" in chapter 2 of *Le Gouvernance par les nombres*, available at: https://www.fayard.fr/sciences-humaines/la-gouvernance-par-les-nombres-9782213681092

We also do not know whether the utilisation of any of these measurement schemes motivates or demoralises government officials and the leaders of anti-corruption agencies, nor whether it divides or unifies and strengthens or weakens the role of civil society organisations that advocate for change. Does the use of international measures replace or displace national efforts to independently appraise the scale and consequences of corruption and the effects of new policies and institutions intended to combat them?

Officials with an anti-corruption mandate say they need to know whether they are doing well, so that they do not believe that they are succeeding when they are failing. But global measures of corruption are not fit for these purposes: they do not help public officials diagnose, design, and implement sustainable policies of anti-corruption and then monitor and evaluate their effects; they do not help them appreciate changes in the scale and character of corruption, prioritise and coordinate the interventions of auditing or investigative bodies, or devise remedies for the side-effects of anti-corruption campaigns; they do not help government leaders and corporate CEOs understand or communicate with the public about the accomplishments or setbacks in efforts to curb, contain, or combat corruption. And yet measures that serve these purposes are sorely needed to avoid the inclination of public institutions to claim success and declare progress where in fact there might be regress and failure. So where can one find them?

We see two options: one is to repurpose the existing array of measures of corruption, cannibalise the data on which they rest, disaggregate the scores by variables that matter most to governments, and in general retrofit global indices for local purposes. We attempt some of that reworking here. Another possibility is to develop new indicators, bespoke measures that gauge conduct which matches local ideas about what is and is not corrupt and worth stopping.[3]

Neither of these options is ideal. The former requires time, access, skills, and other resources that are scarce; the latter requires power, influence, and respect. Trying to do both at the same time can tie one up in knots: the leaders of anti-corruption institutions must manage the political impact of indicators that are not at all useful for them while also trying to create their own indicators that will not be as powerful as the ones that they are trying to deflect.

A different response to this quandary is to articulate some of the purposes and principles that might animate the development of alternatives to gross global measures of corruption and to invite government officials into such a collaboration. It might seem grandiose to call for and guide a "next generation" of measurement, so here we merely sketch a few principles that might underwrite an effort to create something new. We realise these principles might not keep any future measures from betraying their purposes; like medicine, indicators and indices tend to get utilised for all kinds of ailments. But the initial step here might foster further discussion about what kind of measures practitioners truly need, and how we might go about helping to develop them.

Note that what we are proposing here is **not** more or better indicators of corruption. Instead, we are outlining an approach to the development of measures of **anti-corruption**. We are also proposing ways to move past a gauge of the "capacity" to combat corruption toward tools that appraise the repercussions of new efforts to unravel it.[4]

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3   Over a decade ago, a non-government resource center in Norway recommended the development of "subnational," "bespoke" and "proxy" indicators to manage some of these measurement problems. See, for example, Jesper Johnson, "The Proxy Challenge," U4 Brief, July 2013, no. 2.

4   The Capacity to Combat Corruption Index gauges the potential to combat corruption in Latin America rather than the consequences of efforts to curb it. Specifically, using measures crafted by other international organisations, it appraises (a) the legal capacity of the state, (b) the resilience of liberal democracy, and (c) the vitality of civil society. See the account of the methodology for generating that index in the 2022 report, available here, at pp. 37-40.

The paper begins by describing some of the problems with the existing array of global indicators of corruption that may need to be resolved for any alternatives to have traction in many locations. Although bespoke measures might have more lasting value within a single city or country, the need for better indicators is felt in many states. The transnational scope and consequences of grave corruption, moreover, means that progress in one place can be undone by regression in another. Could new indicators help manage that problem, too?

Are global measures really that bad?

The creation of indices of the *perceived prevalence of corruption* across so many countries around the world over the last quarter century created new opportunities and instruments for advocates of change. But the wide array of barometers, indices, perception surveys, and expert assessments of the quantum of corruption are now heavily criticized. Many critics have pointed out that global indices tend to commensurate rather than compare, equalising practices, interactions, and conduct that have vastly different meaning and consequences across countries and cultures. Global indices are also suggestive, especially when they depend on public perceptions: they are buffeted by forces that may have little to do with corruption such as inflation or elections, and they register beliefs and opinions about actions and inactions that might not be corrupt, such as unethical behavior and the poor or delayed delivery of public services. In short, many global measures of corruption are gross: they make it seem ubiquitous in institutions and countries that have important practices of integrity and negligible in places where corruption flourishes in different guises; they register changes in some types of corruption while neglecting the evolution of other forms.[5]

The preoccupation with "petty corruption" in many indices – that is, the measurement of compelled or opportunistic payments for essential public services, what some scholars call "need" corruption – has led to complaints that a bias is baked into the measurement schemes.[6] For example, countries in the Persian Gulf such as Qatar score and rank higher in the Corruption Perceptions Index than many other Arab countries, despite corruption scandals involving prominent public officials and fraud and bribery on a grand scale that involves international organisations and large multinational firms.

Global schemes for the measurement of corruption also have unwanted side effects, and they can beget new problems as well. Systems that rank countries and governments can fuel gaming, cynicism, and opportunism by focusing attention on corruption in neighbouring countries or in ones just below you on the ladder. Measures that focus on the magnitude of the problem can suffocate or politicise systems for the remediation of corruption, especially where they are frail or not designed to fix large scale problems, such as in criminal justice, which can responsibly manage only a fraction of the investigations that are referred to police or prosecution and struggle greatly where corruption in business and government is widespread and justice systems are themselves infected by corruption. Schemes for gauging the global prevalence of corruption, finally, may discourage ambitions to counter it by discounting accomplishments in one country, agency, or sector that are offset or negated by deterioration in another. Despair, a form of complacency Sarkozy did not mention, can result from global indices that raise expectations beyond reason or register little change.

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5   See Jaylia Yan, "Something is Rotten from the State of Demark," *Global Anticorruption Blog*, June 25, 2021. See also Minna Kimpimaki, "Corruption in a Non-Corrupt Country: What Does Corruption Look Like in Finland," *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice*, v. 42, issue 2-3 (2018)

6   For an illustration of the utility of this distinction, and its consequences for collective action to curb corruption, see Monika Bauhr, "Need or Greed? Conditions for Collective Action against Corruption," *Governance*, 30/4, 2017.

Some of these problems might be solved or ameliorated by designing measures that reflect vernacular notions of corruption or the priorities of residents in a specific locale, whether it is petty and predatory, or grand and symbiotic, or intransigent or easily fixed. But other problems will not be so neatly solved or elided, including the challenge of developing discerning and discriminating measures of *anti-corruption*.[7] Leaders in government and business need measures that reward the slow and subtle workings of efforts to curb corruption; they need indicators of the vitality of inter-agency cooperation, especially across borders and in partnership with civil society; they need measures of practices that do not respond to interventions and whose opportuning causes strengthen and foster yet more corruption.

Some of these challenges might be insuperable or just not fixed by the measures themselves, however. Take, for instance, the problem of attribution – that is of identifying what has worked and why and allocating credit in ways that do not disrupt relations between agencies whose comity and continued cooperation is necessary, may be an enduring conundrum. A recent review of anti-corruption developments in Italy put the puzzle this way: "while corruption remains a very serious problem, and by some measures has even worsened in some ways, Italy's anti-corruption institutions are not ineffective."[8] If that's right, then measures of anti-corruption must distinguish been collective progress and institutional accomplishment, assign credit and responsibility where it is due without indifference to the aggregate. That bind can only be managed by wise political arrangements for the governance of anti-corruption strategies.

Still, there are problems that must be addressed in and by the measures themselves. Below we highlight two here that are not intractable and yet mar global measures in ways that have noxious effects for the politics of anti-corruption: these are challenges relating to the *credibility* of the measures and their *compatibility* with one another, even in one country.

1. Credibility

Some measures of corruption are simply hard to believe, and their credibility can be stretched by the same force that gives them wide appeal – their geographic reach. For instance, the measure of corruption with the third greatest geographic scope is Gallup's "World Poll," which each year solicits public perceptions of the amount of corruption in government <u>and</u> business in 172 countries.[9] Gallup asks a single, unstructured, and guileless question: "*is corruption widespread throughout government and business in your country*?" As the data in Figure 1 show, nearly 60 percent of residents in Canada in 2006 thought "corruption" was widespread in government, while 40 percent thought it was widespread in business. These rates declined to 40 percent and 30 percent in 2008 before nearly reverting in 2020 to their previous position.[10]

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7   The World Bank's <u>World Governance Indicators</u> include a component on the "control of corruption," but that measure in fact reflects the prevalence of corruption as perceived by individuals and institutions deemed expert.

8   See Daniel Feldman, "<u>The Efficacy of Anti-Corruption Institutions in Italy,</u>" *Public Integrity*, v 22, no. 6 (2020).

9   The World Governance Indicators, one component of which measures a country's "control of corruption," track developments in 200 countries. The Corruption Perceptions Index measures corruption in 180 countries.

10   Figure 1 also shows that the perceived prevalence of corruption is higher in many countries, although the relationship between beliefs about corruption in government and business is nearly the same, with equal portions of the public saying it is widespread in both.

Figure 1. *"Is corruption widespread throughout **government** and **business** in your country?"*

Public opinion about politics in Canada is notoriously dour.[11] Surveys regularly find that Canadians have little faith in the integrity and competence of their government, especially after tragedies, natural disasters, and political scandals. For example, after the recent exposure of an enormous amount of money laundering in Canada, half of respondents in a survey said they believed the government lacks the ability to stop it.[12] That might be true; money laundering could be so entrenched in the political economy that no government on its own could curb, control, and reduce it. But the practical problem with Gallup's measurement scheme is that few public officials are likely to believe, or can afford to believe, that corruption is "widespread throughout government," and even if they did, this measure doesn't tell them what to do -- whether they should start by reducing corruption in business or government, or in what sectors of commerce and public administration the two intersect most wickedly.

We have no direct evidence that public officials dismiss public opinion polls more than other forms of political seismography. But public perceptions are "suffused with beliefs," as social scientists like to say, and at the same time also highly suggestive, making it difficult to discern what animates change in response to opinion polls. For example, a recent survey in Tunisia found that users of Facebook perceived much more corruption in government than those who did not use Facebook.[13] It also discovered relatively high levels of trust in the military, despite credible evidence of widespread corruption in that institution. Moreover, nearly

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11 Previous surveys found even higher levels of public belief in the extent of corruption in government. For example, a survey in 1996 found that 75 percent of Canadians "strongly agreed" or "agreed" that "political corruption is a widespread problem in this country." See the account in Michael Atkinson: "Discrepancies in Corruption Perceptions or, Why is Canada So Corrupt"? *Political Science Quarterly*, 126/3 (Fall 2011).

12 See "Corruption in Canada: Seven in Ten Support an International Court to Fight Global Corruption," Angus Reid Institute, May 5, 2022.

13 A recent study from China found a "negativity bias effect" among frequent users of the internet, who expressed higher perceived levels of corruption in government than persons without such access. See Chenzhi Yi and Shujia Hu, "Does Internet Access Increase the Perception of Corruption?" *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 77 (2022).

half of respondents said the "temptations" of corruption are so great that no measures would be capable of generating concrete results, which is a sign that the saturation of political discourse with claims about an epidemic of corruption could undermine sustained engagement in democratic politics.

2. Compatibility

Another problem with global measures of the extent of corruption is that different measurement schemes produce divergent estimates of its prevalence, some of which are difficult to reconcile without conjecture or recourse to relativism. For example, as figures 2 and 3 below show, Gallup's World Poll registers perceptions of the amount of corruption that are nearly twice as high as the Afrobarometer's measure of its perceived prevalence for every country in Africa except Gabon, Togo, Guinea, and Benin. Gallup's World Poll also produces much lower estimates of the amount of corruption across Europe than the Eurobarometer does for countries that joined the EU before 2000 (with the exception of Italy and Belgium), whereas its estimates are higher than those of the Eurobarometer for all countries that acceded after 2000. Perhaps we should not be surprised; the different systems define corruption differently, ask different questions on their surveys, and use different response scales.[14] They are not measuring the same thing, despite claims about the commensurability of corruption across the world, and potential users of the results might disagree or be confused about which estimate to believe.

Figures 2 and 3. *Contrasting Perceptions of the Prevalence of Corruption:*

Afrobarometer v Gallup, 2019   *Eurobarometer v Gallup World Poll*

Afrobarometer (most or all of the following officials are "involved in corruption")
Gallup (yes, corruption is widespread throughout government in my country)

Eurobarometer   Gallup

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14   The Afrobarometer, for instance, asks "how many of the following officials are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?" and invites respondents to choose between "all," "most," "some" and "none." The Eurobarometer, by contrast, combines two different notions of corruption in its survey, soliciting responses to the following question for multiple government agencies: "Do you think that the giving and taking of bribes and the abuse of power for personal gain are widespread among any of the following?"

Gallup, Transparency International, Bertelsmann, and the World Justice Project all produce divergent appraisals of the amount of corruption within individual countries as well. Take, for example, the estimates of the amount of corruption in Tunisia over the last 12 years by the four measurement schemes, which are depicted together in Figure 2. Gallup's data show a precipitous decline in public perceptions of the integrity of government between 2010 and 2011. When Ben Ali fled the country in 2011, 86 percent of respondents in Gallup's poll thought corruption was "widespread" in government (note that we've had to invert the score on the scale since the other instruments gauge the "absence" of corruption). By contrast, Bertelsmann's Transformation Index, which asks a panel of experts to appraise whether officer holders who abuse their positions are "prosecuted and penalized" and to what extent the government "contains" corruption, generated a more favorable assessment of the amount of corruption in Tunisia in 2011 as well as less volatile estimates over subsequent years. Compare that to the World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index, which combines appraisals from expert opinion and public perceptions and yields a more favorable impression of the "absence of corruption" across four dimensions of government than both BTI and Gallup, and no statistically significant change over the last seven years. Meanwhile, Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, a compound measures that utilizes the BTI, WJP and 8 other sources of data, suggests there is not as much corruption as the others claim, and that it has been decreasing every year since 2014.

Figure 4. *Four Estimates of the Relative Absence of Corruption in Tunisia*

By itself, the incongruity of these results might not be a problem; nor is the market competition that encourages these organisations to use different definitions of corruption, ask different questions, and draw on different sources of data. Perhaps the diversity of methods and claims is something to celebrate; maybe it fosters dialogue between civil society organizations and government, or deliberation within government about why public appraisals are often more negative that expert estimates. But it is also possible that irreconcilable differences in the results feeds the temptation to focus only on results that are pleasing.

Reconciling divergent assessments takes patience and skill. Consider the UK government's effort to reconcile findings from an even wider array of indicators depicted in Figure 5. The Global Corruption Barometer, Global Fraud Survey, and Global Economic Crime and

Fraud Survey produced vastly different impressions of not only of the amount of corruption in business, but also of the direction of the trends. The contradictions were too great to be ironed out in an average, and they did not inspire new government action. Instead, the government's Anti-Corruption Champion concluded that the data were "worth exploring further."[15]

Figure 5. *Excerpt from UK Anti-Corruption Strategy, 2017-2022, Year 2 Update*

Indicator	Previous Score	Current Score	Rank	Trend
Doing Business assessment (DBA) – protecting minority investors	75 (2018)	75 (2019)	8	Stable
Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) "How many of you think that UK business executives are involved in corruption?"	49% (2013)	21% (2016)	NA	-28 pp (improvement)
Global Fraud Survey (GFS) – "Do bribery/corrupt practices happen widely in business in your country?" (% yes)	28% (2017)	34% (2018)	NA	6 pp increase (declined)
Global Economic Crime and Fraud Survey (GECFS) – Percentage of U.K. respondents that report having experienced bribery and corruption in the last two years. (% yes)	6% (2016)	23% (2018)	NA	17 pp increase (declined)
Exporting Corruption Report (ECR)	Active Enforcement			

The DBA aims to measure the strength of shareholder protections against misuse of corporate assets by directors as well as shareholder rights, safeguards and transparency. The assessment indicates the UK has remained static since the last assessment and has an overall global ranking 8th.

The GCB indicates that public perception that business executives are corrupt has dramatically improved; dropping from 49% to 21% of people believing business executives engage in corrupt behaviour.

In contrast, the GECFS suggests an increase in businesspeople who report having experienced corruption in the UK over the last two years. It is unclear currently why this may be, though the small sample sizes of the GECFS and the GFS can potentially make the data somewhat volatile over time. In any case, it would be worth exploring further.

On the other hand, perhaps the purpose of any measurement scheme is just this – to inspire reflection, an embrace of ambiguity, and desire to continue analysing disparate findings. Maybe it is unwise to imagine that any measurement scheme, no matter how sensitive to variation in the cultural meanings of a social practice, could yield the kind of evidence on which wise decisions in public policy can be made. But where does that leave us?

3. Getting Objective?

One suggestion is to use or build "objective" indicators of corruption, measures that directly gauge its incidence or that rely on administrative agencies to make expert determinations of the frequency and magnitude of its occurrence. For instance, regulatory bodies, auditing agencies, investigative bodies, and ombuds organisations all record suspected instances of corruption, each in their own way and perhaps according to different standards but whose cooperation could in the end create a shared pool of data that might be assessed in the way that threat assessments are made in national security or suspicious bank transactions are

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15   The UK government report stated that appraising progress "is not easy," and relied on help from the U-4 Resource Center in Norway to reconcile the conflicting impressions from these figures. See p. 11 of the Year 2 Update, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/902020/6.6451_Anti-Corruption_Strategy_Year_2_Update.pdf

analysed in the financial sector. This idea has appeal because of the coordination it might induce between independent entities that we rely on for the disparate functions of detection, investigation, and remediation. But it does not solve the problem of under-recording corrupt transactions and relationships, only a fraction of which become known to non-participants.

A related idea is to focus on the response to corruption by law enforcement bodies such as the police or justice agencies with responsibility for prosecution, adjudication, and punishment and measure the impact of their work on individuals, organisations, and perhaps sectors in which corruption is believed to be most prevalent or pernicious. For instance, some anti-corruption agencies measure the number of convicted people, the duration of their sentences, the size of fines, and compare these sums from one year to another as a way of gauging the progress of anti-corruption efforts. The French Anti-Corruption Agency (AFA), the Corruption Practices Investigations Bureau in Singapore (CPIB), and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in Indonesia all use measures born of criminal justice processes to gauge the effectiveness of their actions. But these methods tend to rely on the workload of their own institution as the denominator for calculating the conviction rate, which yields a statistical self portrait rather than a painting of the shifting landscape of corruption.[16] . They do not resolve the problem of detecting the dissuasive effect of criminal justice, or exposing or changing the conduct of enabling forces. Moreover, they typically capture the smaller organisations and less competent agents of corruption.

4. Going Local?

If the shortage of political will to fight corruption remains one of the problems that global measures of corruption were intended to solve, then support for the local development of indicators of corruption and anti-corruption might make more sense. Some national anti-corruption commissions, such as the Anti-corruption and Civil Rights Commission in South Korea (ACRC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission in Nigeria (ICPC, have developed their own systems for measuring corruption and the conditions that beget and tolerate corruption. These measurement systems, which might be considered indirect indicators, treat the character of changes in public administration as the barometer of progress, even when improvements or deteriorations in the corresponding measures may not result directly from their interventions, investigations, and guidance. One of the values of the focus on integrity in public administration, according to the designer of one such system, is the ability to detect changes in the "performance" of the public service, whose susceptibility to corruption may be a corrigible source of procurement fraud and the continuing high cost and low quality of public works in developed as well as less-well developed countries.[17]

16   For an account of the complications of using the conviction rate at the CPIB, see Jean Iau, "Graft Reports Plunge to Five Year Low Amid Pandemic," *The Straits Times*, April 23, 2021. For an account of the self-evaluations of the work of the KPK, see "Measuring the Performance of An Anti-Corruption Agency: The Case of the KPK in Indonesia," *International Review of Public Administration*, v 16, no. 3, 2011.

17   See also Kyoung Sun Min, "The Impact of Corruption on Government Performance," *Crime Law and Social Change*, 2022.

For instance, the ACRC's integrity assessment, one of the most elaborate and sustained enterprises in the measurement of governance we have seen, uses dozens of indicators of integrity of the processes in public administration rather than of the individuals involved; it also does not attempt to attribute improvements to its own reviews and recommendations.[18] The ICPC, by contrast, measures changes in the structure of budgets and composition of expenditure in many government agencies, which facilitates their interrogation by other departments as well as civil society organisations, and may reflect a theory of how to combat corruption indirectly, such as by reshaping the conditions that permit embezzlement, fraud, and kick-backs to thrive.[19]

Both these schemes manage some of the problems with the credibility of measuring corruption by going local and combining the tacit knowledge of residents with the explicit knowledge of professionals in the fields of accounting and auditing and other forms of certified expertise. The believability of the findings does not come from their purported universal validity, but rather from the commitments of the individuals involved in their production, and their accountability to the communities in which they work. The utilisation of skills and intuition from inside the country, moreover, may compensate for the interests and predilections of foreign observers. These measures might not help outsiders compare progress across countries, but they could foment innovations that help reduce corruption and strengthen the ability of civil society organisations that lack statistical expertise to use their findings for their own purposes. In short, the ability to compare countries, which underwrote the theory of politics behind global indices, might take a back seat to local drivers and navigators.

We think this is the way forward. Authoritative national accounts of integrity and the conditions enabling or disabling corruption can solve some of the problems of credibility and compatibility with global measurement schemes or at least supplement them and serve as partial correctives.[20] The cultivation of more independent national systems of measuring corruption make it difficult to discern whether improvements in one setting are offset by deterioration in neighboring states. But their cultivation might inspire emulation, especially where corruption is displaced rather than solved and thereby incentivise a local or regional market for their production and distribution which small civil society organisations could lead.

5. Purposes of New Measures

The purposes served by the measurement of corruption might vary considerably across institutions and countries as well as within agencies and over time. We do not intend to essentialise or universalise any specific function of measurement; instead, we outline here four purposes that might appear in many countries and agencies, even if the methods of their composition and computation will vary greatly. Still, at a minimum, we believe public officials need measures of corruption that:

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18 For an account of the methods for the integrity measurement assessment, see Kyoungsun Min, "The Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Policies: Measuring the Impact of Anti-Corruption Policies on Integrity in the Public Organizations of South Korea," *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 2019.

19 For examples, see the infographics and other reports on the revamped website of the ICPC: https://icpc.gov.ng/

20 Many anthropologists believe the iatrogenic effects of global counting exercises are just too great to be countermanded by the production of more artisanal statistics and more vernacular social facts. For a recent exposition of this view, focusing on the consequences of global counting in public health, see Siri Suh, *Dying to Count: Post Abortion Care and Global Reproductive Health Politics in Senegal*, Rutgers, 2021.

1) are aligned with their roles and responsibilities rather than the magnitude of the problem. That is, they need indicators that capture outputs and outcomes they can responsibly influence.

2) focus attention on the conditions in government and business that will continue to create opportunities for corruption in the future rather than indicators which cast light on past incidents, participants, and beneficiaries of graft.

3) incite sustained partnerships with peer agencies and civil society over time, which highlight and strengthen relationships and interactions that transcend moments of accountability or impunity.

4) highlight the pedestrian workings of government and the value of simple steps in support of the rule of law. Monetary measures of the value of assets recovered, profits disgorged, and sentences imposed might not be reliable indicators of the realisation of these ideals.

6. Principles of Construction

We believe that a new generation of measures of corruption and anti-corruption could be built around seven principles.

First, measures of corruption should focus on *responsibility rather than liability.*. They should not seek to allocate blame, find fault, or vilify individuals or organisations for shortcomings, or at least not only do that, but instead help (re)distribute responsibility for solving the problems in business and government that beget corruption. Good measures of anti-corruption should incite cooperation and coordination between agencies instead of fueling competition in the anti-corruption business, both within a single country and between them. Indicators that individualise the causes of and remedies for corruption could abbreviate further the already short attention span of elected governments.

Second, measures of corruption should *help decision-makers understand and assess policy options*, a first step toward building pathways for better public administration. For example, where new rules and technologies for combatting corruption are under consideration, proffers of their value should appraise their likely repercussions for the vitality and integrity of public administration. If corruption will always "fight back," as it is often said in Nigeria, then the measurement of corruption should avoid breeding new opportunities for evading its detection.

Third, measures of corruption should focus on the *containment of corruption* rather than ending, eliminating, and eradicating it.[21] A culture of "zero-tolerance" for corruption might be un-realistic and counterproductive, for it can induce timidity in public administration and a fear of making controversial decisions that might lead to allegations of impropriety.[22] Perhaps the ethos of harm-reduction and risk-management are superior to a dogmatic fight, especially if the costs of combatting corruption exceed the benefits. In short, there is tension and possible trade-off between a culture of compliance and a culture of integrity in government,

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21 Campaigns to end and eradicate many global scourges such as malaria, extreme poverty, and violence against women have foundered on promises that are unrealisable in short order.

22 In his book on the discovery of corruption as a global cause cèlèbre, Ivan Krastev argued that "The fear of anticorruption accusation paralyses the energy of government officials and the major objective of the policy makers is to opt for solutions that look clean regardless of what other disadvantages they can have." See *Shifting Obsessions*, *Three Essays on the Politics of Anti-Corruption*, Budapest, 2004, CEU Press.

the risk of some corruption in procurement may be worth accepting in exchange for other public goods.

Fourth, measures of anti-corruption should *gauge the resilience of prevention systems*, including prosecution. They should test whether institutions can withstand episodes of corruption and bounce back from exposure or infection. For example, they might appraise whether the imposition of corporate liability in civil and criminal law revitalise markets rather than just alter the conduct of individual firms, and they might gauge whether public inquiries and audits have the effect of complementing and reinforcing such effects or conflict with them.

Fifth, measures of anti-corruption should *utilise existing systems of information*, especially ones on which government agencies rely on for routine decision-making, evaluation, and reporting. There is a risk of two sets of books becoming a norm, with national governments producing one account of the accomplishments and international non-government organisations producing another. This does not mean the glut of survey data and expert assessments of corruption around the world should end up in the dust bin of history; they could be recycled and repurposed. They might, for example, help answer questions that address acute local concerns, such as whether there is a growing or shrinking gap between public opinion and official belief about the magnitude of the problem and whether elite sense of the priorities of anti-corruption match those of the public.

Sixth, measures of corruption should be *dynamic and relational*, focusing on changes in the relationships between licit and illicit economic activity, grand theft and petty graft, international and national countermeasures, and the combined work of auditor generals, public prosecutors, and anti-corruption commissioners. Like ethics and viruses, corruption evolves, and in response to shifts in its shape and diffusion public officials will need to adjust their measures and strategies for its containment.

Finally, measures of anti-corruption should be *prospective rather than retrospective*. Global indices today are mostly used to indicate the amount of corruption in a specific jurisdiction, not whether it decreases or increases over time and in what direction. Quantification of the amount of corruption could be of second priority compared to the description of the corruption trend. Future measures should highlight what has yet to be done to curb corruption. They should point out where governments might need to do more – where corruption is resistant to or even immune from certain kinds of treatments – as well as where they might do less (where, for example, cultures of integrity might be self-replenishing).

7. Outstanding Questions

Opinions diverge about whether public perceptions should figure in global or local measures of corruption and anti-corruption. Some people say that public opinion, no matter how fickle and uninformed, offers a helpful counter-narrative to expert accounts of the extent of corruption and the success of its effort to reduce it. As the leader of one anti-corruption agency put it, "people's state of mind" about corruption should matter to how governments appraise their own performance. Some people also believe that public participation in efforts to curb corruption are a force multiplier, with civic concern about the political integrity of the state (rather than just episodic bribery, procurement fraud, and price-fixing) being one of the few replenishable resources in public policy. On the other hand, some say that the use of public perceptions indulges the kind of populism that fuels the instrumentalisation of politics, the demonisation of elected officials, and the fetishisation of criminal justice as the solution to corruption. The division of opinion on this matter is not easy to bridge.

There are further questions that need to be resolved, regardless of whether any new measures produced according to these principles are local or global. For instance, does the identity of the person or institution that produces a measure matter, and if so, does it matter for the public credibility of the indicators or for the authenticity of the account? How much change over what period and with what kinds of relapse or reversion should officials expect in campaigns to combat corruption in a specific sector or industry? What kinds of support systems in civil society will governments need in order to generate credible measures?

MEMBER BIOGRAPHIES

KAMEL AYADI

Founding Chairman of the Global Infrastructure Anti-Corruption Center MENA (GIACC – MENA) and member of the Board of Directors of the World Justice Project, Tunisia

Kamel Ayadi is an international consultant and civil society activist in the fields of anti-corruption, ethics, governance, corporate social responsibility, and social accountability. He has served in a number of high-level positions, including Minister of Public Service, Governance, and Anti-corruption; Chair of the Authority on Financial and Administrative Control; Secretary of State; Senator; and Chair of the Regulatory Authority of Telecommunication. After having served in leadership positions in numerous NGOs, including President of the Tunisian Order of Engineers, he was elected in October 2003 as the president of the World Federation of Engineering Organisations (WFEO, 100 member countries). He also served for six years as the Founding Chair of its standing Committee on Anti-corruption. He is the Founding Chair of the World Leadership and Ethics Institute, Founding Chair of the Tunisian Centre for Strategic Thinking on Economic Development. He is also the Founding Chair of the Global Infrastructure Anti-corruption Centre's for the MENA region.

SHAMILA BATOHI

National Director of Public Prosecutions, South Africa

Career Advocate Shamila Batohi has served as South Africa's National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) since February 2019. Advocate Batohi began her career as a junior prosecutor in the Chatsworth Magistrate's Court in 1986 and steadily advanced to become the Director of Public Prosecutions in KwaZulu-Natal. She was seconded to the Investigation Task Unit established by President Nelson Mandela in 1995, investigating and prosecuting apartheid-era atrocities, and later served as the first regional head of the Directorate of Special Operations in KwaZulu-Natal, investigating and prosecuting serious organised crime and political violence. Immediately before her appointment as NDPP, she served as a Senior Legal Advisor to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in the Hague.

MONIKA BAUHR

Professor at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden

Monika Bauhr is a Professor at the department of Political science, University of Gothenburg and a research fellow at the Quality of Government Institute. Bauhr investigates the causes and consequences of corruption and quality of government. She studies the link between democracy and corruption, the role of transparency and access to information, women representation and the nature of different forms of corruption and clientelism. She also investigates how corruption influences public support for foreign aid, international redistribution and the provision of public goods more broadly. She has previously been a visiting scholar at Harvard University, Stanford University and the University of Florida in the US and the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. She has also served as a consultant and participated in public events relating to climate change, corruption and development policies. Between 2014 and 2017 she has been the Scientific Coordinator and Principal Investigator of the ANTICORRP (Anticorruption Policies Revisited: Global Trends and European Responses to the Challenge of Corruption), a large-scale multidisciplinary research program, involving 20 institutions in 15 European countries, funded by the European Commission. She is also a co-editor of the recently publishedOxford Handbook of the Quality of Government.

MARTHA CHIZUMA

Director-General of the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), Malawi

Martha Chizuma is the Director General of the Anti-Corruption Bureau effective from 1 June 2021, the first-ever female to hold the position in the country. The Bureau is mandated to fight corruption through prevention, public education and law enforcement. She holds a master's in law from the UK and bachelor's in law (Hon) degree from Malawi. Before joining the Bureau, she was Ombudsman of Malawi from December 2015 to May 2021. However, she has also held various positions in the judiciary and private sector. With fighting corruption being on top of the Government agenda, Martha is responsible for providing strategic leadership to operational and administrative processes at the Bureau in a manner that ensures that positive and substantive inroads are being made against corruption in Malawi and also that a correct moral tone is set for the country in as far as issues of integrity are concerned.

IZABELA CORRÊA

Secretary for Public Integrity at the Brazilian Office of the Comptroller General and editor of the Chandler Papers (2021-2024)

Izabela has been dedicated to the themes of integrity and anti-corruption academically and as a practitioner for over fifteen years. She is currently serving as the Secretary for Public Integrity at the Brazilian Office of the Comptroller General. Prior to that, she was the Postdoctoral Research Associate for the Chandler Sessions on Integrity and Corruption (2021-2023). She has also served in the Brazilian Central Bank (2017–2021), and in the Brazilian Office of the Comptroller General (2007–2012), where she led a team of public officials that oversaw the development and implementation of high-impact transparency and integrity policies. Izabela holds a PhD in Government from the London School of Economics and Political Science (2017) and a master's degree in political science from the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) in Brazil. She is a member of the Chandler Sessions and the managing editor of its paper series (2021-2024).

JAVIER CRUZ TAMBURRINO

Compliance Officer of the Chilean Central Bank, Chile

Javier Cruz Tamburrino is the Compliance Officer of the Chilean Central Bank. His main responsibilities include, among others, designing and implementing an Annual Compliance Plan, coordinating and articulating the compliance activities with the Prosecutor's Office, the Comptroller's Office, the Division Management Corporate Risk and the other areas of the Bank. Prior to joining the Central Bank, Javier Tamburrino served for nine years as Director of the Financial Analysis Unit (UAF), a public service whose mission is to prevent Money Laundering (ML) and the Financing of Terrorism (FT) in the Chilean economy, also acting as National Coordinator of the ML/TF Preventive System of Chile.

TODD FOGLESONG

Lecturer and Fellow-in-Residence Munk School, University of Toronto, Canada

Todd Foglesong joined the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy at the University of Toronto in 2014. He teaches courses on the governance of criminal justice and the response to crime and violence in global context. In cooperation with the Open Society Foundations, he is developing a peer-based system of support for government officials that seek to solve persistent problems in criminal justice. Between 2007 and 2014, Todd was a senior research fellow and adjunct lecturer in Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School (HKS). Between 2000 and 2005 Todd worked at the Vera Institute of Justice, creating a center for the reform of criminal justice in Moscow and founding Risk Monitor, a non-governmental research center in Sofia, Bulgaria that supports better public policies on organized crime and institutional corruption. Before that, Todd taught political science at the Universities of Kansas and Utah.

GUSTAVO GORRITI

Founder and Editor of IDL-Reporteros, Peru

Gustavo Gorriti leads the investigative center at the *IDL-Reporteros*, in Lima, Peru. He was Peru's leading investigative journalist before having to leave the country, largely because of his reporting. During the April 5, 1992, coup, he was arrested by Peruvian intelligence squads and "disappeared" for two days until international protests forced President Alberto Fujimori first to acknowledge his detention and then to release him. Gorriti had earlier investigated, among other things, the drug ties of the man who became Fujimori's de facto intelligence chief. After several months of mounting threats and harassment, Gorriti left Peru for the United States, where he was a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the North-South Center. In 1996, he settled in Panama and went to work for La Prensa. Gorriti's investigative reporting there, however, had a similar effect, and the government attempted unsuccessfully to deport him. After Fujimori lost power, Gorriti returned to Peru in 2001. Gorriti was a Nieman fellow in 1986. He received the Committee to Protect Journalists' International Press Freedom Award in 1998.

JIN WOOK KIM

Chief Prosecutor of the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO), South Korea

Jin-wook Kim is Head of the Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials. Prior to his current position, he was head of the international affairs department at the Constitutional Court of Korea (2020–21), and head of the education department and research department, at the Constitutional Research Institute (2016–20). He holds a master of law from the National University of Seoul, where he also graduated in archaeology and art history. He holds an LLM in public law from Harvard University.

JOHN-ALLAN NAMU

CEO and Editorial Director of Africa Uncensored, Kenya

John-Allan Namu is an investigative journalist and the CEO of Africa Uncensored, an investigative and in-depth journalism production house in Nairobi, Kenya. Africa Uncensored's ambition is to be the premier source of unique, important and incisive journalism. Prior to co-founding Africa Uncensored, he was the special projects editor at the Kenya Television Network, heading a team of the country's best television investigative journalists. He has received numerous awards for his work including the CNN African Journalist of the Year and joint journalist of the year at the Annual Journalism Excellence Awards by the Media Council of Kenya.

BOLAJI OWASANOYE

Chairman of the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), Nigeria

Owasanoye started his career as an assistant lecturer at the University of Lagos. He moved to the National Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (NIALS) in 1991 and became a Professor of law 10 years later. In August 2015, he was appointed as the Executive Secretary of the Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption (PACAC) before being appointed to the ICPC in 2017. He was involved in advocacy for passage of major anti corruption bills in Nigeria including Nigeria Financial Intelligence Agency Act , Proceeds of Crime Act, and reenactment of the Money Laundering Prevention and Prohibition Act and the Terrorism Prevention Act, amongst others. At the continental level he participated in drafting and advocating adoption of the Common African Position on Asset Recovery by the African Union in 2020 and served as member of the UNGA/ECOSOC established FACTI Panel in 2020-2021. His portfolio of consultancies include Nigerian federal and state agencies, as well as international development agencies such as the World Bank and USAID, DFID and UNITAR. In 1997, he co-founded the Human Development Initiative (HDI), a non-profit organisation. In 2020, He was awarded the rank of Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN) and national honour of Officer of the Federal Republic (OFR) in 2022.

ANNA PETHERICK

Associate Professor in Public Policy at Blavatnik School of Government, United Kingdom

Anna Petherick is a Departmental Lecturer in Public Policy and Director of the Lemann Foundation Programme. She is co-Principal Investigator of the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT) project, which, going back to January 2020, has been recording and analysing how national and subnational governments around the world have been enacting policies to fight the pandemic. Her research as part of OxCGRT focuses on combining policy data with behavioural data, from surveys and mobile phone records. In addition, she works on corruption, gender and trust, with much of it based in Brazil. Between her undergraduate and graduate studies, Anna worked as a full-time journalist. She wrote a column for The Guardian that fused longevity and wellbeing research (how to die as late as possible, and until then stay as happy and as physically young as possible), and another column about the social dimensions of climate change for the journal, Nature Climate Change. Anna holds a BA (MA) in Natural Sciences (Evolutionary Genetics, Population Modelling) from Cambridge University.

KATHLEEN ROUSSEL

Director of the Public Prosecutions, Canada

Kathleen Roussel is the Director of Public Prosecutions. She was appointed June 21, 2017. Kathleen was Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions from 2013 to 2017. She was responsible for the Regulatory and Economic Prosecutions and Management Branch. Previously, Kathleen served as Senior General Counsel and Executive Director of the Environment Legal Services Unit at the Department of Justice (Canada), from 2008 to 2013. From 2001 to 2005, she was the Senior Counsel and Director of the Canadian Firearms Centre Legal Services, before joining the Department of Environment's legal services later that year. Before joining the public service, Ms. Roussel worked as a criminal defence lawyer. She has been a member of the Law Society of Upper Canada since 1994 and graduated from the University of Ottawa Law School in 1992, having previously obtained an Honours Religion degree from Queen's University.

AGUNG SAMPURNA

Former Chairman of the Audit Board of the Republic and Lecturer at the University of Indonesia, Indonesia

Dr Agung Firman Sampurna was the Chairman of the Supreme Audit Agency for the period 2019 – 2022. Previously, he served as Member I of BPK-RI for the period 2014 – 2019, Member III for the period 2012 - 2013, and Member V for the period 2013 - 2014. Agung Firman Sampurna once led the Main Auditorate of Finance State (AKN) III (2012 – 2013), AKN V (2013 – 2014), and AKN I (2014 – 2019). Recipient of the Mahaputra Naraya Star, Agung Firman Sampurna is heavily involved in training activities, research, seminars and various other forums, both domestically and abroad. Agung holds a Bachelor of Economics from Sriwijaya University, a Master of Public Policy and Administration from the University of Indonesia and a PhD in Public Administration also from the University of Indonesia.

TANKA MANI SHARMA

Former Auditor General, Nepal

Tanka Mani Sharma Dangal is a Nepalese Bureaucrat. He has long experience in Public Financial Management and fiscal administration. He has experience in Public Procurement Management and development administration, Civil Service Administration and Training, Cooperative Societies Regulation and Management, Health Sector Financing, Public Enterprises Management, and other different areas of public sector management. He served as an Auditor General of Nepal from 2017 to 2023 for 6 years. His prior positions include Secretary at the Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers, Ministry of General Administration, and Public Procurement Monitoring Office. He had also served as a Director General of the Inland Revenue Department, Department of Customs, Department of Revenue Investigation, and the Registrar of the Department of Cooperative. likewise, he had served as Finance Chief in different Ministries and Departments of the Government of Nepal.

Mr. Sharma holds a Master's degree in Business Administration (MBA). He has attended various national and international training and seminars and acquired knowledge and skills in different fields of the public sector management and governance system. He has rewarded with the "Best Civil Service Award" in 2001 by the government of Nepal. He has awarded the medal "Prasidda Prabal Janasewa Shree" by the president of Nepal in the year 2021. He was also awarded the "Prabal Gorkha Dakshin Bahu" medal in 2000.Mr. Sharma hopes to build a more efficient and effective public administration, promoting good governance through transparent and accountable public sector management. Moreover, he emphasizes maintaining professional integrity and controlling mismanagement and corruption in the governance system.

CHRIS STONE

Chair of the Chandler Sessions on Integrity and Corruption, United Kingdom

Chris Stone is Professor of Practice of Public Integrity. Chris has blended theory and practice throughout a career dedicated to justice sector reform, good governance and innovation in the public interest, working with governments and civil society organisations in dozens of countries worldwide. He has served as president of the Open Society Foundations (2012–2017), as Guggenheim Professor of the Practice of Criminal Justice at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government (2004– 2012), as faculty director of the Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations at Harvard University (2007–2012), and as president and director of the Vera Institute of Justice (1994–2004). He is a graduate of Harvard College, the Institute of Criminology at the University of Cambridge, and the Yale Law School. At the Blavatnik School, Chris's work focuses on public corruption turnarounds: the leadership challenge of transforming cultures of corruption into cultures of integrity in government organisations, large and small. As an affiliate of the Bonavero Institute of Human Rights within the University's Faculty of Law, Chris serves as the principal moderator for the Symposium on Strength and Solidarity for Human Rights.

LARA TAYLOR-PEARCE

Auditor General, Sierra Leone

Lara Taylor-Pearce is auditor general of Sierra Leone and has more than 27 years of experience in public- and private-sector financial and administrative management and oversight. As the government's chief external auditor since 2011, she has won praise for helping change Sierra Leone's public-sector accountability landscape, including her work in developing its 2016 Public Financial Management Act and other public-sector oversight acts. Among other honors, she received the 2015 National Integrity Award from the Sierra Leone Anti-Corruption Commission. She has also served as principal finance manager and head of administration for the Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project, finance and administrative manager for the Public Sector Management Support Project, technical assistant in the Accountant General's Department of the Ministry of Finance, and supervisory senior for KPMG Peat Marwick. An honours graduate in economics of the University of Sierra Leone, she is a fellow of the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (FCCA), U.K, and of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sierra Leone (FCASL). She is vice chair of the INTOSAI Development Initiative (IDI) board, chair of the governing board of the African Region of Supreme Audit Institutions-English Speaking (AFROSAI-E), and a Grand Officer of the Order of the Rokel (GOOR) President's National Award.

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